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SENSITIViTY ANALYSiS
The question of the extent to which the results described in the preced-
ing chapters depend upon the particular values chosen for such key
parameters as executives' discount rates, outside income, and nontaxable
deductions and exemptions has been raised in a number of connections
Each time, the argument has been that the techniques employed to meas-
ure the worth of the various deferred and contingent compensation de-
vices under consideration are such that the outcome of an empirical
application of those techniques should be affected very little by rather
substantial changes in the parameters involved. Itis the task of this
chapter to document that assertion.
Procedure
The approach will be to cast tip, from the body of data compiled for
the study, a profile of the career of a "typical" executive, and then to
test the impact on an analysis of his compensation of a series of changes
in assumptions as to the conditions under which that compensation was
received. The alternative would be to redo the calculations for the entire
sample some fifteen or twenty times, changing one or two parameters
for each triala strategy which is rejected as not onk impractical but
unnecessaryThe resultsof theinvestigation have been presented
throughout in terms of the collective experience of executives in fifty
corporations, and a sensitivity analysis which concentrates on the re-
wards of an "average" individual as derived from the careers of those
executives should provide as useful an appraisal of the influence of the
several parameters chosen as would a full reconstruction of the various
calculations.
Since the procedures employed in valuing the components of the pay
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package made it possible to separatethe computations relatedto execu-
tives' stock options from those for theirother rewards,' the samesepara-
tionvill be effected here. The typicalexperience tinder an option plan
will be examined independently andwill be concerned only with those
individuals who were granted optionsrather than with the entire sample
studied. This will serve to highlightthe features of the valuation tech-
niques constructed for an instrumentwhich we have seen to be almost
as important a source of remunerationas salary and bonus for top
corporate executives during the late l950's andearlyl960's. Those
techniques and the nature of the contingenciesinvolved are sufficiently
distinctive that some extra concentrationon them seems appropriate.
The Typical Executive: A Profile
Because most of the conclusions presented abovehave been based on the
mean values of the compensation provided by the fiftycorporations
studied, a similar viewpoint will be adopted inreconstructing the ex-
perience of a typical executive. The magnitudeof his rewards and the
timing of their receipt will be specified simplyby summing the relevant
dimensions of the careers of thesome 550 individuals for whom data
were compiled and dividing by the total number of observations applic-
able to each. For example. the mean length of timean executive appears
in the sample is almost exactly fourteenyears: There are 7.802 man-
years of data and a total of 558 executives. Of those fourteenyears,
the last tenor 5,300 of the total 7.802werespent among the five
highest-paid positions in the man's firm andare our most direct concern.2
Information on the compensation he enjoyed during the four earlier
years is, however, necessary to a proper valuation of his subsequent
rewards and must therefore be taken into account. Finally, since allor
part of the data for some 20 per cent (1,561 man-years) of the history
analyzed could not be gathered from proxy statements and had to be
estimated, the figures for the first three years of an executive'scareer will
normally be of this type.3
'See the numerical example presented in Chapter 6.
2 See Chapter 7.
' With few exceptions, it was during the early years of the executive'scareer
wherein such extrapolation was necessary.260 EXECUTIVE CO.\I PENSATION
Given the indicated framework. thesize and the pattern Over time of
the pertinent rewar(IS are easilyobtained. We finn that the mean age of
the 558 executives when theyinitially appeared in the sample was just
over 49 years. Duringthat first year they averaged $6 1,750 in before-tat
salary and bonus, were promised$4,04() in annual noncontrihutory pen-
sion benefits, and were required tocontribute an average $510 toward
financing of a prospective annualcontributory pension benefit amounting
to $3,600. A minority were,in addition, the beneficiaries of deferred
compensation and profit-sharing plans,the anticipated annual post-
retirement payments under which come to$130 when averaged over the
entire sample. Nine years was the mean termof such plans; i.e., payments
were to begin at age 65and continue through age 73.Similar calcula-
tions were made using the data observedfor the second and subsequent
years of each executive'sexperience, the compensation totals being
divided by the number of individuals contributing to them in every
instance.
On that basis, the "typical" compensationhistory shown in the tabu-
lation on p. 261 emerges. In order to analyze this history,it is necessary
to specify the calendar-year period covered,since the tax rates relevant
to the various computations have fluctuatcd over time.The mean year in
which the individuals under consideration first appeared in the sample
turns out to be 1942, and that year is therefore adopted as a reference
point, i.e., the career of our typical executive will be said to have begun
in 1942 and ended in 1955. The tax schedules employed in the subse-
quent analysis reflect this convention.
Parameter Changes
The assumptions about the nature of the compensation environment
which were built into the empirical results described above took the form
4 All such averages will be rounded to the nearest fullear for purposes °
the following computations.
As a matter of convenience, the few profit-sharing plans confrontedall of
which provided for a single large payment at age 65were included inthis
category by assuming that the lump sumexpected was instead to he paid out
in nine equal annual installments asifitwere a deferred compensation ar-
rangement. This assumption permits a single computation tosufficehere fom
both rewards even though the two devices were evaluated separately in the main
body of the study.
Excluding for the moment any stock option grants.SNSlTIVJTy ANALYSIS 261
Expected
Annual Fxpected Expected
Non- Annual Execu- Annual
Contribu- Co nt rihu- t ive's Deferred
Before-Tax tory tory AnnualCompen-
Salary and Pension PensionContrihu- sation
Bonus Benefit Benefit tions Benefit a
49 $ 61,750 $ 4,040 $ 3,600 $ 510 .$130
50 65,290 4,940 4,340 610 170
51 68,210 5,490 4,990 700 210
52 72,790 5,930 5,270 760 310
53 74,660 6,790 5,730 860 500
54 76,710 6,980 6,200 910 690
55 83,130 7,430 6,740 980 730
56 84,880 7,830 7,260 1,100 1,140
57 91,000 8,740 8,220 1,270 1,710
58 97,950 9,520 9,250 1,460 2,290
59 107,620 11.070 10,350 1,610 2,670
60 114,630 11,830 11,370 1,770 3,360
61 121,560 11,810 12,330 1,910 4,600
62" 132,180 12,960 12,870 1,940 5,890
a The average duration of the benefit promise is nine years throughout.
The fact that the mean age of the executives when they disappear from the
sample is below 65-the normal retirement age-should not seelo surprising.
For one thing, even if they all did retire "on time," they would he only 64 years
old during the last year of their careers, and that would be the figure we would
observe. Some, of course, died prior to retiring, others retired early, and a few
resigied along the way to take a job with a company not in the sample. In ad
dition, one tirm studied set retirement at age 60 for its executives, thereby con-
tributing to a 1oser average. The most important factor, however, is a purely
technical one: Because the compensation data examined end in 1963, there arc
a number of executives whose histories necessarily are terminatedin midstream
and svho were rather younger than 65 when they were last seen.
of choices as to the values of three parameters: the discount rate used in
measuring the present value to the executive of any deferred payments,
the fraction of his annual earnings which were claimed as deductions and
exemptions, and the amount of income he received from sourcesother
than his corporate employer. An annual rate of 24 per cent after taxes
was taken to be the relevant discount ratefor pension and deferred
compensation benefits; executives' deductions and personalexemptions
were put at 10 per cent of gross incomethrough 1950 and 15 per centIi
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thereafter; and outside income svas assumed to Come to 15 PCent of
before-tax salary arid bonus receipts. As'test of the impact ofthcs
choices, our typical executive's career will be evaluated uSing fIrst the
indicated parameters and then a series of alternative assumptions In
particular, the discount rate'il I be doubled to 5 per cent, deductiiisand
exemptions figures of zero and 20 per cent will be tried, and theexecu
tive's outside income set equal to zero, 25, and 50 PCI cent of his annual
salaryand bonus. Since some portion of the data listed for the first three
years of his career is likely to have been estimated, additional calculations
in which those estimates are variedbyas much as 50 pCI CCUt will be
undertaken. The results of these trials should encompass as wide aranCe
of possibilities as iieed occupy us here.
Outcome of the Tests
A total of thirteen sets of computations were made. The first incorporated
the environmental assumptions adopted in tile fllillfl body of the study.
The next nine assumed different values, one at a time, for each of the
three parameters at issue and for the executive'searlycompensation data,
The last three tested several combinations of such changes designedto
identify the extent to which they offset or reinforce each other. A list
of the sequence of the various assumptions is presented in Table 35 and
a sampling of the outcome of the calculations in Table 36.
Changes in the absolute magnitude of the numbers generated are, of
course, not our real concern since the conclusions arrived at in previous
chapters have dealt with the relationships between thecomponents of
The figures used for thefirstthree years' compensation data intrial No.
8 require sonic explanation. The objectivess as to consider the impact on the
analysis of overestImates of those figures.thereis,howcvr, alimitto the
amount of overstatement that can occur if we observe a steadily rising trend
in the man's earnings. Once we know the actual fIgures for his salary, prospective
pension heneilts, etc., for an' L'iVefl year, wecati he fairlconfident that those
which ssere associatedss ith previous years were lower. Therefore,if we wish
to test the effect of larger numbers than theones listed for ages 49,50. and SI
for our typical executive, they should not exceed theircounterparts at age 52 if
the test is to ba meaningful. In keeping with that constraint.the decision here
was simply to split the difference arid adopt the resulting figures as a "SI) per
cent overestimate" of the data'Flie salarv'anj bonus figure for age 49. for
example.v, as setat $67,270halfwav between the originalestiniated)S61.-
750 and the S72.790 recorded forage S2 A sititilar procedure was adopted for
the other items of compensation observedin the first threeears.SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
1 AItI I35
Sequence of Assumptions Used in the Sensitivity Analysis











2'/2 l0through 1950: 15
I5thereafter
2 5 Same as Trial I IS
3 2" Same as Irial I None
4 2'/ Same as TrialI 25
5 2'/ Same as TrialI So
6 2'/i None IS
7 2'/ 20 IS
8 All parameters as in Trial I . hut first three years' compensa-
tion data raised by one-half the difference between the
recorded figures and those listed for year four (see foot-
note 7).
9 All parameters as in Trial I, hut first three years' compensa-
tion data reduced by 20 per cent.
10 All parameters as in Trial 1, hut first three years' compensa-
lion data reduced by 50 per cent.
II 5 Same as Trial I 50
12 2'/2 None None
13 2'/2 None 50
the pay package and with their rates of growth. For that reason,the re-
suits of the thirteen trials indicated may be summarized forinterpretation
simply by recording for each year (1) the percentages of ourtypical
executive's total after-tax compensation which are attributable tohis
salary and bonus, on the one hand, and his pension anddeferred com-
pensation benefits on the other, and (2) the pattern of increasesin the
value of all three over time. These figures provide asmuch information
about the influence of changes in parameters and errorsin estimation
as we require. The relevant comparisons arepresented in Tables 37 and
38. The numbering of the trials corresponds to thatof Table 35./
I (tltiflh1e(IJ






I3elorc-Iax.\l'tct-I ax\t'tctI ax .AttCF- lax
Salary Salary (urrent (nirent
Ageand Ronitsand RonusEquivalent 1'qLlivalent ( °'flPeflsation
49 6 ,7S()
I rio! Vu,iihe,I
30.870 2,91(1 3() 33.810
50 65.290 28.550 3.48(1 40
SI 68.210 29.320 3,91(1 SO
52 72.790 30.440 4.170 81) 34(9()
53 74.660 34.990 4.770 (4)) 39.9(1(1
54 76.72(1 35.621) 5.120 210 4(1.950
55 83.1 3(1 49,77(1 5.891) 55,88(1
56 84.88(1 5(1.561) 6.63(1 40
57 91.00(1 53.190 8.470 77(1 )43()
58 97,95(1 53,97() 10.361) 1.150 65.480
59 107.62(1 53.85(1 I 3.471) 1.41(1 68.7o
60 I 14.630 56.270 15.85(1 2.020 71.141)
61 (21 .560 62.640 17.330 3,5!( 83,470
62 132.180 66,250 21.1(1(1 6.820 94.17(1
1 ritil A';i:nh'r 2
49 61.750 30.87(1 2.640 2( 33.530
51) 65.29(1 28.550 3.170 31) 31.750
SI 68,21(1 29.32() 3.560 30 32.9(0
52 72.79(1 3ft440 3.790 50 34.80
53 74.66(1 34.990 4.360 (4)1) 39.450
54 76.720 35,620 4.680 15(1 40.450
55 83.130 49:77(1 5.4(10 160 55.3 3()
56 84.88(1 50,56(1 6.11(1 31(1 56.98(1
57 91.00() 53,19(1 7.87(1 560 61.62(1
58 97.950 53.970 9.690 854) 64.503
59 107.620 53.850 12.73(1 I .060 67.640
60 114.630 56.27(1 15.050 1.54(1 72.860
6! 121,560 62.640 (6.470 2.76(1 81 .870
62 132.180 66.250 2(1.150 5.530 9! .931)SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 265
I -\ttl i36 (concluded)
mw!N,azber 5
49 61.75() 28.150 2.48(1 30 30.660
St.) 6S.29() 25.490 2,960 4() 28,490
51 68.210 26.08() 3,320 40 29.440
52 72790 26.950 3,510 70 30.530
53 74.660 31.570 4,040 120 35,73()
54 76.720 32.060 4.330 19G 36.580
55 83.130 46.3 10 4.920 200 51.430
56 84,88() 47.020 5.580 390 52.990
57 91.000 49.450 7.150 690 57.290
58 97.950 49.650 8.670 1.030 5935()
59 107.620 49.620 11.240 1.260 62.120
6() I14.63() 51 .740 13.250 1.790 66.780
61 121,560 57,3 10 14,410 3.100 74.820
62 132,180 60,440 17.440 6.010 83.890
Trial Number 7
49 61.75() 35.370 3.000 30 38.400
50 65.290 33,830 3,620 40 37,491)
SI 68.21() 34,860 4.090 50 39.000
52 72.790 36,47() 4.370 80 40.92()
53 74.660 40.710 5.030 ISO 45.890
54 76.720 4 1.530 5.420 220 47.170
55 83.130 54.810 6.2 10 230 61.250
56 84.880 55.710 7,010 450 63.170
57 91.000 58,860 8,940 790 68,590
58 97.950 57 .500 10.920 1.180 69.600
59 107,620 57.980 14,230 1,450 73.660
60 114,630 60.690 16.790 2,080 79,560
61 121.560 67.200 18,360 3,62(1 89.180
62 132180 71.400 22.490 7.060 100.950
1)eferred
l'ension(onIpensatiull
Uetore-IaxAfter-laxAfter- lax After-lax Fatal
Salary Salai ('uue,l.t (un-cut After-Tax
Ageand Bonusand BonusEquivalentEquivalent(onipensationr /
Looking first at Table 37, we see that there is remarkablylittle change
in our assessment of the significance of deferred andcontingent rewards
in the pay package regardless of the values chosenfor the several pa-
rameters. The percentages observed fall withina very narrow range in all
cases where only one parameter is changed from its original value (trials
2 through 7), and the fIgures recorded for trial 1, whichincorporates the
assumptions actually used in the study, consistently fallmidway between
the extremes of that range. A similar conclusionemerges from the cal-
culations (trials 8 through 10) which involverevisions in the conipensa-
tion data listed for the first threeyears of the man's career; the per-
centage composition of the pay package is virtually unaffected.
The circumstances which produce themost noticeable change in the
percentages arc exemplified by trialsIi and1 2. For the former, the
assumptions built into trials 2 and 5were combined and for the latter.
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i37
Atier Fax Salary and Bonus as a Per ( cut ol 'Fond Aflei -Fax







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































026$ '(:(i ivi: ()l I' IN sArloN
together a Set of cOiRlittulls whosecikets on the :1sissceiJ likeit
to be in the same direction.Fven athat, the numbers icneratel arenot
significantly ditiercnt IroflI those oftrial I, and the :tssumptioris illVOl\'ed
describe a pair of conipeflsatiofl eflViFOflIflCUtSwhich must eertairll\ be
near the fringes ofreasonableness. In the one case, the executive is
assumed to have outside income equal tofully half his pretax salary and
bonus and to be able to realize S percent per annum aftertaxes on iii-
vestnientS which are in the same categoryof risk as government bonds;
in the other, there is no outside incomeof any kind and the man claims
no deductions or cXefliptiOflSfrom taxable income in computinhis per-
sonal tax liability. Finally, trial 13 wasmade as a test of the degree to
which changes in parameters whichhave opposite ellects On the analysis
when taken singly will operate to offset eachother when combined. The
assumptions adopted for trials 5and ((no deduct ions and exemptions
but outside income amounting to 50 per cent ofsalary and bonus) were
superimposed. As would be expcctcd, the results are much like those
obtained in trial 1.
In conaring the various sets of figures totrial 1,itis worth noting
that in those instances where a change iii assumptions does give rise to a
slight difference in our appraisal of the percentageconiposition of the
pay package, the difference is almostinvariably maintained throughout
the fourteen-year period examined. Therefore, evenif there are some
minor discrepancies in the data due to errors in estimation or in choosing
the values of the relevant parameters. those errors will have little impact
on perhaps the most important conclusionsuggested by the present
study: the extent to which there has been a shift in emphasis within the
executive compensation package over tune toward a greater reliance on
deferred and contingent rewards. That shift is clearly identified in all
thirteen trials and has essentially the same dimensions in each. Chart
28 summarizes the comparisons.
Further support for these assertions is olTered in Table 3$. which
indicates the rate of growth in the value of the typical executive'S after-
tax remuneration under the assumptions listed above. The calculations
use as a base the compensation figures for the year when theexecuti\e
is age 53 in order to make it possible to compare the results of the
thirteen trials, since several of them specify changes in the magnitude of
the man's rewards during the early years of his career. Obviously, if theSENSITJ\'ITy ANALYSIS 269
('hART28
cep'ciu"j,v .4 nalvci.v Resu!tv: .Va!arv and Bonusu.s a
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EXECUTIVE AGE
original data for ages 49, 50, and 51 are revised, any time series based
thereon will be affected. Our interest, however, is in the impact of such
revisions on an evaluation of the man's compensation over thelast ten
years depicted because, as we saw, it was during thatperiod that lie
occupied one of the fIve highest-paid executive positions in his firm.
The interval from age 53 through age 62 is therefore the pertinent one.
It is clear from the tabulations that the pattern of growth in the value
of the several rewards changes very little in response to theindicated
changes in assumptions. Variations in the discount rate (trial 2), in the
amount of outside income (trials 3 through 5), andin the early corn-FXF('t.J1I\'1(O'st PFNSAItON
pensation data ( trialsthrotigli 10) have a iielieible ifllp1Th
apparently alter the valueot all three elements of the pay package to
just about the same extentin everyear and thereby leave the historjcti
profile intact. Changes Inth,kuuetiottsiifl(lexetliptions PCrCCnta
(trials 6 and 7produce slightly more pronounced eflects, but the latter
are noteworthyonly by comparison. ForeXaIllj)le, the fact that theratio
of our typicalecut,ves aggregate' after-tax remuneration at age 62 to
that at age 53 fallsfrom 2.36 in trialIto 2.21.) in trials I) and 7 implies
a decline inthe compound annual rateofrowth between the twoyears
of just of 1per cent--from9.5 to per cent.' At that, the deduc-
tions andexemptionS figures adopted forthe tests representextreme
situationS, and. evenit' relevant br certain individuals, their intluence
may vell be offset h' errorsin the opposite direction in other j)arameters
Some evidence of this isollered by the results of trials II and 12, for
which, as before. the valuesof two parameters were changed simultane-
ously, interestingly enough.the parlieul:ir changes jnvolved were chosen
originally because their effects on ananalysis of the percentage com-
position of the pay packagescented likely to--and in tact didreinforce
each other. It turns out, however,that the same combinations of changes
have offsetting effects insofar as rates ofgrowth are concerned. Trial 13
illustrates the reverse phenomenon.
Despite SOffiC minor variations of this sort, the results of the tltirten
trials are quite similar. If there is an' one characteristic ofthe data which
stands out, it is the tendency for most changes in the parameters to pro-
duce time series which detine a lower rate of growth in the value of the
pay package than that outlined bytrialI-It would appear. then, that if
there have been errors made in specifying the magnitude of those pa-
rameters, they have been predominantly in the direction of overstating
the secular increase in the compensation of the executives who comprise
The difference hetween these rates and the approximately 3 per cent per
annum recorded in Chapter 8 for the entire sample is, of course,due to the
concentration here on a single individual's career. During the ten sears sshenhe
is one of his firm's top live oflicers. he is likclto he moving to a sucCessiOn
hisher positions, a rid his reriru nerat ion can he e spccted to grow more raLidl
than that associated with any one of the otlices he holds. Since the data in
Chapter 8 were castinter us of the deveIopment' within the same position
over time,itis not surprking to find that the rates of grcs ttiobsersed there
were lower,SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 271
the sample. Such errors would only strengthen the majority of the con-
clusions which were drawn above from the experience of that sample.'
Stock Options
The same arguments can be made in connection with executive stock
options. Of the 558 individuals whose compensation histories were
examined, 221 (40 per cent) were granted at least one option. Since
there were a total of 518 different grants observed, the average was
slightly in excess of two per person. All hut a very small percentage
occurred after 1950. The aggregate after-tax remuneration produced
amounted to some $80.5 million, or approximately $364,000 foreach
recipient.
It will be recalled that one feature of the valuationtechniques em-
ployed in generating these figures was a stipulation thatnegative current
equivalents were ruled out. Even if the pattern of annual changesin the
value of a particular individual's option(s) wassuch as to dictate that in
a given year an assessmentshould be made against his salary and bonus
in order to "recoup" some portion of the currentequivalents previously
credited to him, that assessment was not recorded.Instead, the combined
current equivalent of his options for the year was setequal to zero, the
argument being that in practice thiswould almost certainly be the lower
limit of any such arrangement.'° Since itrequires a fairly severe decline
in common stock prices to createsituations of this sort, the contention
was that the results of anempirical analysis of executives' experiences
with options would not be affected verygreatly if the procedure described
were adopted. A tabulationof the number of cases in which anegative
current equivalent for an executive wasindicated, but ignored, supports
this claim: The total of $80,505,000in stock option current equivalents
would have been reduced by only$650,000byof 1 per centhad
negative values actually been taken intoaccount.1'
See especially, Chapters 8 and 9.
" See Chapter 4.
11 Itshould he stressed, however, thatthisresult depends heavily on the
particular time period under considerationHad the general trenu of stock
prices since 1950 not been sofavorable, negative stock option current income
equivalents would have been much moreof a problem here.r
272 ix1cu r ivii coipi:srio
A "'I'V Pi(At'' SlOt' K OPTION IiIS1 ()R\
As WaS true ot peilSiolls ansi sietert 0(1 conlperlitltsnrrrngente15 fh
most ellicient method for deterniiniiag the impact of CI1ilfltCS in tax
rates
and opportunity costs Oil stock option rewards is to concoltrale or
appraisal of the experience of a "typicalexecutive. In addition
.Stock
options have been such an inaportantand controversial___._Soiirceof
managerial remuneration in recent years that a (lesCrlption of the circum.
stances surrounding the average recipient anlong the senior officers of
large manufacturing firms is of more than passintinterest in itsow
right. That profile will once again he drawn in terms of the pwn values
for the sample.
The typical optionce \'aS granted an option on two difiereiitoccasions
The first such occasion was in 1954 and the age of the executive just
under 54 'cars. The mean option price was exactlS52. a figure which
represented approximately 97 per cent of Ihe then-market price ofthe
optioned stock. The arrangement conferred the right to purchasea total
of 7,337 common shares of the employer corporation, and theaverage
term of the option was seven years.1 A second grant typically followed
three years later. It covered 4,444 shares at a mean option price S35.18
higher than that of its predecessor. hut was also seven years in duration.
In over 90 per cent of the cases studied, the executive exercised each
of his options in full within four years of the (late of granting. This
pattern did not vary significantly among successive grants to thesame
individual. The usual situation consisted of the exercise of approximately
62 per cent of the option during the third year of the contract and the
remainder during the subsequent year. B combining these observations
with the history of stock price movements under the variousarrange.
ments, we may describe the experience ol a typical option recipientas
follows:
Else last figureis soniess hat tower than might he anticipated on the basis
of the nominal option term of tencars which was chosen by most firms in
the sample. The difference is explainedprimarils hthe fact that a great nian
options were granted to individuals whoitthe time had fewer than ten years
of employment rcmaininstints! retirement. For them. the effective term of the











Stock Price and Exercise Data:
End-of-Year Number of Shares









If some of the later stock priceslisted seem high as comparedwith the
range in which mostcorporations' shares are traded, itis because the
data incorporate an adjustmentfor stock splits and stockdividends. All
prices are expressed in terms of theequivalent of one share of stock out-




1957 91.98 4.549 $ 81.79
1958 100.61 2,788 100.55
OPTION NUMBER 2
Granted 1957
Executive age 57 years
Number of shares 4,444
Option price $87.18 per share
Term 7 years
Stock Price and Exercise Data:
End-of-Year Number of Shares Market Price
Year Stock Price Exercised at Exercise
1957 $ 91.98 -
1958 100.61 -
1959 107.33 - -
1960 127.16 2,755 $116.97
1961 135.79 1,689 135.73274 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The issue, then, is whether the resultsof an analysis of thecompensa
tion provided by these options areaffected very greatly by changesin
assumptions about executives' personal tax circumstances and market
opportunities. As we saw, such assumptions take the form of specifying
just two parameters: the tax rateapplicable to the profits realizedand
the discount rate used in calculating the presentvalue of the appropriate
stream of "current incomeequivalent" payments* A figure of 15per
cent was chosen for the former.This was an estimate of the extent to
which the statutory 25 per cent capital gains rate would be softened in
practice by the deferral of the tax, by the tax savings attributable to the
additional deductions and exemptions which option profits seemed likely
to give rise to, and by the possibilitythat sonic executives would avoid
the tax entirely by passing on the shares acquired in their estates
Similarly, historical evidence as to the average rates of return obtained
from investments in common stocks suggested 5 per cent per annum
after taxes as a reasonable discount rate.
\Vith only these two parameters to contend with, a sensitivity analysis
of the option experience depicted is easily accomplished. The task is
made easier by the fact that the impact of changing one of the param-
eters can be predicted exactly: because the tax rate chosen enters into
all computations of the actual and prospective rewards associated with
options as a scale factor, the numbers generated by the valuation pro-
cedures adopted are simply a linear function of that choice. Thus, if
the 15 per cent rate actually employed were changed to 20 per cent,
the current income equivalents of the stock options received by every
executive in the sample would be reduced to 80/85 of their original
values.1The implication for a sensitivity analysis therefore is clear.
The higher the tax rate assunied, the lower the remuneration credited
to options.
It is also true, however, that the range of meaningful assumptions is
sufficiently narrow that the possible effects of changes therein on the
empirical results cannot be very great. For example, it was reported
in Chapter 8 that stock options accounted for some 27 per cent of the
aggregate after-tax remuneration enjoyed during the years 1955 through
13See Chapter 4.
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1963 by the five highest-paid executives in each of the fifty corporations
studied. Had the tax rate on option profits been set at 20 instead of 1 5
per cent, their shareof the total pay package would have fallen to 26
per cent over the sameperiod 11a decline which does not seem large
enough to cast much of a shadow on any conclusions reached above.
Similarly, the resulting change in tax assessments would have lowered
the compound annual rate of growth in totalafter-tax compensation be-
tween 1940 and 1963 only from3.34 to 3.27 per cent. A decrease in
the tax rate to 10 per cent would, of course, produceequal but opposite
effects. Since the "true" rate must lie somewherebetween zero and 25.
the numbers generated by the 15 per centfigure chosen for the study
cannot be far wrong.
The consequences of changing the discount rateused in the calcu-
lations ate less predictable, but turn out tobe no more pronounced.
Table 39 records the current incomeequivalents derived from our typi-
cal executive's stock option experienceunder the assumption first of a
5 per cent per annum after-taxopportunity cost and then a figure of
10 per cent. The differences betweenthe two "total" columns each year
indicate that doubling the discount rateincreases the calculated value of
the remuneration provided by theoption some 6 per cent. Since thisis
about the extent of the change thatwould ensue were the tax rate raised
to 20 per cent, the level of our concernwith the sensitivity of the em-
pirical results should be similar. Indeed,if both parameters are revised
simultaneously, their effects pretty wellcancel, as the third set of figures
in Table 39 illustrates.'In any event, it would require agreater change
in the relevant discount ratethan that considered here tosignificantly
alter the outcome of the computations.Figures in excess of 10 per cent
per annum after taxesdo not, however, appear verymeaningful.
Summary
Insofar as assumptions aboutcorporate executives'personal circum-
stances have beenrequired by the valuationtechniques developed in
15That is,to the fraction (80/85)/(0.73 +(80/85)(0.27)I of theoriginal
figure of 27 per ceni.
'Consistent with the argumentsmade above, each ofthese numbersis
precisely 80/85 the size of itscounterpart in the secondtrial.276 EXECUTIVE COMPENSA'I'ION
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preceding chapters, the contention has been that the results of applying
those techniques should not depend heavily on the particular assump-
tions made. An appraisal of a representative compensation history sup-
ports this claim. \Vidc variations in the values of the parameters which
characterize the compensation environment do not produce important
changes in the conclusions reached. The impact of those variations is
cushioned by the (leSign of the current income equivalents offered and
by the emphasis throughout on the relationships between rewards rather
than on their absolute magnitudes.